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INTRODUCTION
On October 27, 2009, Biljana Plavsid finally returned home to Belgrade.' It
was a sunny autumn afternoon, and the locals treated her to a triumphal
reception as she traveled from the airport to her apartment. Plavgid wore a
bright smile and a fur coat; she received hugs and kisses from passers-by along
the way, escorted by the Bosnian Serb Prime Minister himself.2 She had spent
the last six years in a Swedish prison.3
In 2000, Plavgid was indicted by the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for genocide, crimes
against humanity, violations of the laws and customs of war, and grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions.4 The Prosecutor alleged that PlavNi6 had
masterminded a policy of racial extermination and persecution as a member of
the three-person Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina.5 She had
enthusiastically endorsed ethnic cleansing of Muslims and Croats, and
achieved global notoriety after a 1992 photograph showed her greeting fellow
war criminal Zeljko Rainatovi6 with a kiss over the dead body of a Muslim
civilian.'
Plav~i garnered further fame by surrendering to the Tribunal shortly after
her indictment7 and pleading guilty in 2002. Plaviid vowed: "The knowledge
that I am responsible for such human suffering and for soiling the character of
1. See Ian Traynor, Leading Bosnian Serb War Criminal Released from Swedish Prison,
GUARDIAN, Oct. 27, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2oo9/oct/27/bosnian-serb
-war-criminal-freed.
2. See Bosnian Serb Ex-Leader Plavsic [sic] Returns to Belgrade After Release, XINHUA, Oct.
28, 2009, http://english.peopledaily.com.cV9oooi/90777/9o8S3/6796482.html; Milos
Jelesijevic, Biljana Plavsic [sic] Arrived in Belgrade, Serbia, DEMOTIX, Oct. 27, 2009,
http://www.demotix.com/news/biljana-plavisic-arrived-belgrade-serbia; Traynor, supra
note i.
. See Prosecutor v. Plav~i, Case No. IT-oo-39 & 40/1-ES, Decision of the President on the
Application for Pardon or Commutation of Sentence of Mrs. Biljana Plaviid, 1, 6 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 14, 2009) [hereinafter Plavgid's Early Release],
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/plavsic/presdec/enVo9o914.pdf (public redacted version);
Traynor, supra note 1.
4. Prosecutor v. Plavgi6, Case No. IT-oo-4o-I, Indictment (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2000), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/plavsic/ind/erVpla-iiooo4o7e.pdf.
5. Id.
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my people will always be with me."8 In exchange, the Prosecutor agreed to
drop all charges except persecution9 (a crime against humanityo), and Plavgi6
received a sentence of eleven years."
However, in a January 2009 interview with Sweden's Vi Magazine, Plavsi6
withdrew her confession and her apology. She described them as pieces of
political opportunism intended solely to reduce her sentence, claiming, "I
sacrificed myself. I have done nothing wrong. I pleaded guilty to crimes against
humanity so I could bargain for the other charges."' 2
Plavgi6 gave the interview in an apparent fit of pique after the Swedish
authorities rejected her initial application for a pardon in December 20o8.13 In
the same interview, she took potshots at the Swedish Ministry of Justice,
complaining that "[n]one of the other prisoners have read a single book," and
that "[y]our country has nothing to be proud of."' 4 Plaviid had seemingly
resigned herself to her scheduled release date in 2012- commentators noted
that her evident lack of rehabilitation had hurt her chances for early release,
perhaps fatally.'5
But the President of the ICTY disagreed. In the decision approving
Plavgid's early release, President Patrick Robinson contended that she had
exhibited "substantial evidence of rehabilitation"'6 based in part on her "good
behavior during the course of her incarceration."17 He also noted her
8. Statements of Guilt-Biljana Plavi, INT'L CRIM. TRIB. FOR FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, http://
www.icty.org/sid/221 (last visited Jan. 17, 2013).
9. Prosecutor v. Plaviid, Case No. IT-oo-39 & 40-PT, Plea Agreement, 3 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 30, 2002), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/plavsic/custom4
/en/o2o93oplea-en.pdf.
1o. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7(1)(h), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
ii. Prosecutor v. Plaviid, Case No. IT-oo-39 & 40/1-S, Sentencing Judgement, 134 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 27, 2003), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/plavsic
/tJug/en/pla-tjoo227e.pdf.
12. Daniel Uggelberg Goldberg, Bosnian War Criminal: 'I Did Nothing Wrong,' LOcAL, Jan. 26,
20o9, http://www.thelocal.se/17162/2oo9O126/#.UPhieiefuSo; Simon Jennings, Plavsic
[sic] Reportedly Withdraws Guilty Plea, INST. FOR WAR & PEAcE REPORTING, Jan. 31, 2009,
http://iwpr.net/report-news/plavsic-reportedly-withdraws-guilty-plea.
13. Jennings, supra note 12.
14. Goldberg, supra note 12.
is. See Jennings, supra note 12.
16. Plavgid's Early Release, supra note 3, 8.
17. Id. 9.
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cooperation with the Prosecutor" and, perhaps most importantly, the fact that
she had already served two thirds of her sentence, the customary proportion
entitling her to early release.' 9
Although Plav~i was only one of many criminals to be released early by the
ICTY, victims' groups and prominent politicians were particularly vehement
about her case. Representatives of an association of Muslim and Croat camp
victims complained that the decision had "nothing to do with justice" - that the
ICTY had failed to "think about the blood of so many of our children, whom
we are still digging out of mass graves." 20 Zeljko Komsi6, one of the three
members of the Bosnian Presidency, cancelled a trip to Sweden, and a group of
inmates at a Bosnian prison sewed their lips shut in protest."
Plav'i's case starkly illustrates the controversy surrounding the ICTY's
early release policies. Its liberality was not a one-off- if anything, the Tribunal
has since become even more generous. As Part I explains, convicts before the
ICTY, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and Mechanism
for International Criminal Tribunals (MICT) now presumptively need only
serve two thirds of their sentences.
How did this presumption come about, and how does it compare with the
policies of other international tribunals? Will future courts-like the
International Criminal Court (ICC)-also adopt it? Most importantly, is it
defensible on theoretical grounds or as a practical necessity?
To answer these questions, this Note explains the origin of the two-thirds
standard and articulates a theory of early release adapted specifically to
international law. Part I explores current early release doctrine and concludes
that the ad hoc tribunals operate under confused premises -specifically, that
the vagueness of these tribunals' founding documents and the absence of a
consistent arbiter for early release have led to misguided modeling of
international early release after domestic parole. It describes how the ICTY has
promulgated an influential presumption of release at two thirds of sentence
that has been mimicked by the other ad hoc tribunals, and which may soon be
adopted by the ICC as well.
18. Id. 12.
ig. Id. 10.
20. ICTY* Sweden Releases Biljana Plavsic [sic], INT'L JUST. TRIB. 2 (Oct. 28, 2009),
http://sites.rnw.nl/pdf/ijt/IJT-No92.Finale.pdf.
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Part II articulates an alternative theory of early release. It begins by
contrasting the goals of international and domestic criminal law. International
criminal law attempts to condemn serious crimes and reconcile past enemies,
while domestic law achieves reconciliation only incidentally. On the other
hand, domestic policymakers aim to minimize costs and prevent recidivism,
which are secondary issues for international tribunals. Widely differing
objectives imply that international judges should be cautious about borrowing
domestic legal practices wholesale. I argue that such borrowing has backfired
in this case: automatic early release dilutes condemnation and enrages victims
because of its opacity and because commutation has traditionally been
associated with mitigated guilt, as I discuss below.
This discussion lays the foundation for my alternative approach to early
release, which emphasizes changed circumstances of the prisoner. Part II
separates relevant factors-fresh information casting doubt on guilt,
cooperation after sentencing, and humanitarian concerns-and irrelevant
factors, such as remorse (easily feigned, as in Plavgi6's case), the probability of
recidivism, and the gravity of crimes committed. Above all, I suggest that
courts should never grant early release by default.
This is not to say that international tribunals are too lenient or too strict in
general - there is a larger debate on sentencing length in international criminal
law on which I remain neutral. 3 Instead, I contend that the special outrage
surrounding Plavgi6's case reflects more than the usual agitation for harsher
sentences. It suggests something particularly inflammatory about releasing her
early, absent any real remorse or changed circumstances and based on the
attitudes of a single judge. If Plavgi6 deserved to be released after seven years
even in the absence of changed circumstances, then her original sentence ought
to have been seven years. I argue that present early release doctrine does not
serve the principles of international law regardless of one's underlying
normative position on the appropriate length of initial sentences.
My argument fills an important gap in the literature. Academics have
written little about early release in international law, largely due to the lack of
jurisprudence on the subject. Early release following the Nuremberg and
Tokyo Trials was almost entirely motivated by sui generis concerns of politics
22. See infra notes 87-88, 192-194 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., Mark B. Harmon & Fergal Gaynor, Ordinary Sentences for Extraordinary Crimes, 5 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 683 (2007) (arguing that sentences are too short); Damien Scalia, Long-
Term Sentences in International Criminal Law, 9 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 669 (2011) (arguing that
long-term sentences violate human rights standards).
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and fairness rather than lasting doctrinal commitments,24 and the ICTY
and ICTR only commuted their first sentences in 200125 and 2011,26
respectively. A project such as this one has therefore only become viable within
the past decade.
Despite the lack of scholarly attention, politicians and commentators have
vigorously criticized the ad hoc tribunals for their exercise of early release
powers. Complaints have grown louder as the tribunals have grown more
generous in recent years. In March 2012, the Prosecutor General of Rwanda
called the ICTR's release of genocidaire Tharcisse Muvunyi "intolerable" and
demanded "a genuine apology" from Muvunyi as a necessary precondition for
release. 7 Less than a month later, Rwandan President Paul Kagame attacked
the ICTR as "a token meant to blind us and give us the impression that they
are doing justice," concealing the fact that genocidaires are released "shortly
after" conviction. Similarly, Croatian President Ivo Josipovid has suggested
that early release "should be very exceptional" and that he "would never
pardon certain crimes, like rape, murder and war crime."29
So far, such criticisms have centered on the ICTR, ICTY, and MICT
(collectively, the International Criminal Tribunals (ICTs)). The International
Criminal Court (ICC) imposed its first sentence on July 10, 2012,30 and will
likely not consider any applications for release for a number of years. The ICC
24. See sources cited infra notes 31-33-
25. Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-9 5-14/1, Order of the President for the Early Release
of Zlatko Aleksovski (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 14, 2001) [hereinafter
Aleksovski's Early Release].
26. Prosecutor v. Bagaragaza, Case No. ICTR-o5-86-S, Decision on the Early Release of Michel
Bagaragaza (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Oct. 24, 2011) [hereinafter Bagaragaza's Early
Release], http://www.unictr.org/Portals/o/Case/English/Bagaragaza/decisions/nlo24.pdf
27. James Karuhanga, ICTR Early Releases Raise Eyebrows, NEW TIMEs, Mar. 10, 2012,
http://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/index.php?i=14927&a=Su85.
28. See Rwanda Leader Accuses West ofLeniency for Genocide Suspects, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Apr. 7,
2012, http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2o12/o4/o7/rwanda-leader-accuses-west-of-leniency-for
-genocide-suspects.
29. Boris Paveli6, Josipovic [sic] Criticises Early Release of War Criminals, BALKAN INSIGHT,
Mar. 14, 2012, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/josipovic-criticises-earlier-release
-of-war-criminals.
30. Prosecutor v. Dyilo (Lubanga), Case No. ICC-o1/04-o0/06, Decision on Sentence Pursuant
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has time to learn from the successes and failures of the ad hoc tribunals, and to
craft its procedures accordingly.
The topic of early release is therefore ripe for consideration on three
counts: the conspicuous absence of substantive analysis so far, mounting
criticism by politicians and commentators, and the unique inflection point
between the closing of the ad hoc tribunals and the opening of the ICC.
I. CURRENT DOCTRINE
As the Introduction notes, modern early release doctrine originates almost
exclusively in the practice of the ICTs. Prior courts used early release as a
Band-Aid for judicial error rather than as a planned component of a well-
functioning legal system. After the post-World War II trials at Nuremberg and
Tokyo, clemency was widely granted3' in order to win over Japan and Germany
as Cold War allies32 and to compensate for inconsistencies at initial
sentencing.33 It was only with the arrivals in the 1990s of the modern ad hoc
tribunals that early release attained a systematic character resembling its use in
domestic jurisdictions.
However, as we will see, even these Tribunals have applied early release
quite messily. They blur the lines between domestic clemency and parole,
ultimately applying a broad melange of criteria that has led to a much-criticized
spate of releases. Most troublingly, the ICTs have adopted something like a
presumption of early release for the criminals they convict, even in the absence
of cooperation with the Prosecutor or demonstrated remorse.
The policies of these two tribunals will cast a long shadow over
international criminal law. Future courts appear poised to borrow heavily from
31. Mary Margaret Penrose, Spandau Revisited: The Question of Detention for International War
Crimes, 16 N.Y. L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 553, 576 (2ooo) ("Of all the Major War Criminals-
both at Nuremberg and Tokyo-only one came close to fully serving his sentence.").
32. See Valerie Hibert, From Clean Hands to Vernichtungskrieg, in REASSESSING THE
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, TRIAL NARRATIVES, AND
HISTORIOGRAPHY 194, 202-05 (Kim C. Priemel & Alexa Stiller eds., 2012) (addressing
Germany); Henry L. Shattuck, The Interim Mixed Parole and Clemency Board, 76 PRoc.
MAss. HIST. Soc'y 3d 68, 69-70 (1964) (addressing Germany); Sandra Wilson, After the
Trials: Class B and C Japanese War Criminals and the Post-War World, 31 JAPANESE STUD. 141,
143 (2011) (addressing Japan).
33. Landsberg, a Documentary Report, OFF. U.S. HIGH COMM'R FOR GER. INFO. BuLL., Feb. 195,
at 2; John J. McCloy, Statement of US High Commissioner, in id. at 3; see also MARK A.
DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 46-47 (2007).
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the doctrines set by the ICTs.3 As Parts II and IV suggest, the ICC and its
contemporaries would benefit from thoughtful reconsideration of the theory
underlying early release.
A. Sentencing at the ICTs
As a preliminary matter, it is important to survey sentencing practices at
the ICTs. The Tribunals have much in common, including overlapping judicial
benches35 and nearly identical Statutes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence.3'
All three were established by the United Nations Security Council: the ICTR
and ICTY were designed to address specific conflicts in Rwanda and
Yugoslavia, while the MICT was intended as a successor tribunal for the other
two. The MICT has taken over all new trials and enforcement matters
(including early release) from the ICTR since July 2012 and for the ICTY since
July 2013.37
Despite overarching similarities, the Tribunals differ somewhat in the exact
substance of their early release policies. The ICTY followed a policy of early
34. See DRUMBL, supra note 33, at 55.
35. Compare Judges, UNITED NATIONS MECHANISM FOR INT'L CRIM. TRIBs., http://
unmict.org/judges.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2013), with The Chambers, INT'L CRIM. TRiB.
FOR RWANDA, http://www.unictr.org/tabid/lo3/Default.aspx (last visited Dec. 4, 2013), and
The Judges, INT'L CRIM. TRIB. FOR FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org
/sid/1 51 (last visited Dec. 4, 2013). In particular, the Appeals Chambers of the ICTR and
ICTY are identical. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 13(4)
(amended Jan. 31, 2010) [hereinafter ICTR Statute], http://www.unictr.org/Portals
/o/English/Legal/Statute/2010.pdf.
36. Compare Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 28
(amended July 7, 2009) [hereinafter ICTY Statute], http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal
%2oLibrary/Statute/statute-septog_en.pdf, with ICTR Statute, supra note 35, art. 27, and
S.C. Res. 1966, annex 1, art. 26, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1966 (Dec. 22, 2010) [hereinafter MICT
Statute], http://unmict.org/files/documents/statute/1ol222_sc-resl966_statute-en.pdf. The
ICTR explicitly adopts the ICTY's Rules. See ICTR Statute, supra note 35, art. 14. The
MICT's Rules are naturally also similar. Compare Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 49 (May 22, 2013) [hereinafter
ICTY Rules], http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%2oLibrary/Rules-procedure-evidence
/ITo32Rev49 en.pdf, with Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Mechanism for Int'l Crim.
Tribs., U.N. Doc. MICT/1 (June 8, 2012) [hereinafter MICT Rules], http://unmict
.org/files/documents/rules/12o608 rules-en.pdf.
37. MICT Statute, supra note 36, 1.
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release after prisoners serve two thirds of their sentences;"8 in contrast, the
ICTR applied a three-quarters standard in all three of the early releases that it
granted before its closing.39 The divergence stemmed from the perceived
greater severity of crimes before the ICTR.4o While I argue in Part II that early
release should never be presumptively granted, the ICTR briefly left some hope
for future tribunals to follow its relatively restrained example.
But not for long. The President of the MICT has already granted early
release in two cases, and in these cases he explicitly resolved to apply the
jurisprudence of the ICTY over that of the ICTR.4' Because the MICT will
decide the vast majority of ICTR applications for early release, the three-
quarters rule has turned out to be merely a temporary deviation rather than a
competing standard.
Thus, the remainder of my analysis focuses on early release doctrine as
developed by the ICTY. Because of its breadth and its endorsement by the
MICT, future tribunals will likely use it as the primary touchstone for their
own practice.
B. The Statutes and the Four Factors
The ICTY seems to have implemented early release policies that are
significantly more generous than its framers intended. It has adopted
38. See infra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
39. Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR-oo-55A-T, Decision on Tharcisse Muvunyi's
Application for Early Release, 15 11-12 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Mar. 6, 2012),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/o/Case/English/Muvunyi/decisions/12o3o6.pdf; Prosecutor
v. Rugambarara, Case No. ICTR-oo- 59, Decision on the Early Release Request of Juvinal
Rugambarara, 11-12 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Feb. 8, 2012), http://www
.unictr.org/Portals/o/Case/English/Rugambarara/decisions /120208.pdf; Bagaragaza's Early
Release, supra note 26, 8-1o.
40. The ICTR primarily tried genocide, as opposed to war crimes or crimes against humanity.
See Bagaragaza's Early Release, supra note 26, 1o; DRUMBL, supra note 33, at 56-57.
41. See Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. MICT-12-28-ES, Public Redacted Version of
Decision of the President on the Early Release of Omar Serushago, 17 (Mechanism for
Int'l Crim. Tribs. Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.unmict.org/files/cases/serushago/presdec
/en/121212.pdf (" [A]lthough the two-thirds practice originates from the ICTY, it shall apply
to all the prisoners within the jurisdiction of the Mechanism . . . ."); id. 17-19, 34;
Prosecutor v. Bisengimana, Case No. MICT-12-o 7, Decision of the President on Early
Release of Paul Bisengimana and on Motion to File a Public Redacted Application, 5 15-21,
35 (Mechanism for Int'l Crim. Tribs. Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.unmict.org/files
/cases/bisengimana/presdec/en/121211.pdf.
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something like a presumption that prisoners need only serve two thirds of their
sentences, apparently out of confusion between commutation and parole.
The Statutes of all three ICTs contain nearly identical language concerning
early release. The Statute of the ICTY mandates:
If, pursuant to the applicable law of the State in which the convicted
person is imprisoned, he or she is eligible for pardon or commutation
of sentence, the State concerned shall notify the International Tribunal
accordingly. The President of the International Tribunal, in
consultation with the judges, shall decide the matter on the basis of the
interests of justice and the general principles of law.42
The text is intentionally vague: it grants the President of the ICTY wide
latitude to implement her own standards subject only to malleable "interests of
justice" and "general principles of law."
However, it is important to note at this point that the Statute only
contemplates the convicted person's eligibility for pardon or commutation of
sentence, not for parole.43 This is a crucial distinction because, as we will see,
domestic actors grant commutation much less often than they do parole.44 The
plain language of the Statutes suggests that their framers intended early release
to be similarly rare.
Much of the doctrinal movement from standards of commutation to
standards of parole occurs in the Tribunals' Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
which are intended to fill the interstices of their respective Statutes.45 The
Rules all lay out the same four major factors that the President must consider
in her early release decisions: "the gravity of the crime or crimes for which the
prisoner was convicted, the treatment of similarly-situated prisoners, the
42. ICTY Statute, supra note 36, art. 28; accord ICTR Statute, supra note 35, art. 27; MICT
Statute, supra note 36, art. 26.
43. President Patrick Robinson granted conditional remission of sentence to Haradin Bala in
2010, based on the President's understanding of the remission procedures in French law. See
Prosecutor v. Bala, Case No. IT-o3-66-ES, Decision on Application of Haradin Bala for
Sentence Remission, 1 15-16 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 15, 2010),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/limaj/presdec/en/o'os.pdf. However, no other President has
adopted this approach, and pardon and commutation are typically understood to mean
unconditional release.
44. See infra Section I.C.
45. See ICTY Statute, supra note 36, art. 15; ICTR Statute, supra note 35, art. 14; MICT Statute,
supra note 36, art. 13.
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prisoner's demonstration of rehabilitation, as well as any substantial
cooperation of the prisoner with the Prosecutor."46
Procedurally, the Rules require enforcing states to notify the President of
prisoners' eligibility for early release;47 the President must then consult "with
the members of the Bureau and any permanent Judges of the sentencing
Chamber who remain Judges of the Tribunal."'8 However, the ultimate
decision rests with the President alone, who occasionally must overrule her
colleagues when they disagree.49
While most early release decisions consider each of the four factors, the
factors have acquired unexpected contours through time and use. Successive
Presidents of the ICTY have interpreted the "treatment of similarly-situated
prisoners" as implying the present two-thirds standard of early release. While
this standard is internally consistent-as would be a one-third, or a one-
quarter standard-the origins of this generous presumption demand closer
examination.
Because of the importance of consistency in the execution of sentences, the
"similarly-situated prisoners" factor has eclipsed the other three to become
essentially dispositive in the ICTY's early release jurisprudence. High gravity of
crimes has never barred release.s0 (The ICTY is understandably reluctant to
label international crimes as anything but extremely grave.51) Because the
46. ICTY Rules, supra note 36, rule 125; accord Rules of Procedure and Evidence rule 126, Int'l
Crim. Trib. for Rwanda (Apr. 1o, 2013) [hereinafter ICTR Rules], http://www.unictr.org
/Portals/o/English/Legal/Evidance/English/1304oamended%2o6_26.pdf; MICT Rules,
supra note 36, rule 151.
47. ICTY Rules, supra note 36, rule 123; ICTR Rules, supra note 46, rule 124; MICT Rules,
supra note 36, rule 149.
48. ICTY Rules, supra note 36, rule 124; ICTR Rules, supra note 46, rule 125; accord MICT
Rules, supra note 36, rule 150.
49. E.g., Plaviid's Early Release, supra note 3, i1 13-14.
50. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Santid, Case No. IT- 9 5-i6-ES, Decision of the President on the
Application for Pardon or Commutation of Sentence of Vladimir §antid, 4-5, 15 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 16, 2009) [hereinafter §anti6's Early Release],
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kupreskic/presdec/en/o90216.pdf (public redacted version)
(describing Santid's sentence of eighteen years for murder and war crimes, and granting
him early release); Prosecutor v. Deli6, Case No. IT-96-21-ES, Decision on Hazim Delid's
Motion for Commutation of Sentence, 55 3-4, 22 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia June 24, 2008) [hereinafter Deli6's Early Release], http://www.icty.org/x
/cases/mucic/presord/en/o80715a.pdf (public redacted version) (describing Deli6's sentence
of eighteen years for murder, torture, rape, and inhumane treatment, and granting him early
release).
si. See Prosecutor v. Josipovi6, Case No. IT-9 5-16-ES, Decision of the President on the
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gravity of crimes always weighs negatively on a petition for early release, this
factor does not sharply differentiate between cases and is sometimes simply
not addressed.s2
Inversely, cooperation with the Prosecutor is only ever treated as a positive
factor for early release. The Tribunals follow the "generally recognized
international standard[]" "against self-incrimination,"13 so refusal to cooperate
is never treated as a bar or even a negative factor in release decisions.54
Rehabilitation figures somewhat more prominently in early release
decisions, but again it is not dispositive. While the failure of a prisoner to show
remorse has occasionally sparked disagreement in the President's consultations
with her fellow judges,ss the President has nevertheless tended to release
prisoners even in the absence of demonstrated remorse -or even, as in Plavgi's
case, when concrete evidence exists to the contrary.
Thus, early release in the ICTs is now dominated by the two-thirds
standard. In the entire history of the ICTY, the President has only declined to
release a single criminal who had passed the two-thirds mark, and even then
only very reluctantly. (President Fausto Pocar denied Predrag Banovid
commutation based on a technicality in the French law of parole;S6 PoCar Was
naturally concerned that this decision would cause inconsistency in
enforcement, but curiously concluded that "no . . . inequity of treatment is
currently being suffered by Banovid." )
Application for Pardon or Commutation of Sentence of Drago Josipovid, 12 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 30, 2006), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kupreskic
/presdec/en/o60130.pdf.
52. See, e.g., gantiC's Early Release, supra note 50.
53. Murray v. United Kingdom [GC], App. No. 18731/91, Eur. Ct. H.R. 45 (Feb. 8, 1996),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=ool-5798o.
54. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Krajignik, Case No. IT-oo-39-ES, Decision of the President on Early
Release of Mom6ilo Krajiinik, 5 29 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July
2, 2013), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krajisnik/presdec/en/130702.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Tardulovski, Case No. IT-o4-82-ES, Decision of the President on Early Release of Johan
Tar6ulovski, 25-26 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 23, 2011),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/boskosklitarculovski/presdec/en/ilo623.pdf.
ss. See, e.g., PlavIid's Early Release, supra note 3, 13.
s6. Prosecutor v. Banovid, Case No. IT-o2-65/1-ES, Decision of the President on Commutation
of Sentence, 6, 12 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 4, 2007), http://
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One recent case illustrates the primacy of the two-thirds cutoff. On January
9, 2013, ICTY President Theodor Meron granted early release to Mlado Radi6,
who had been sentenced to twenty years in 2001 for crimes against humanity
(including murder, torture, and rape) and war crimes (including murder and
torture).s" Meron noted that Radid's crimes were "of a high gravity,"59 that
there was "little to no evidence of actual rehabilitation,"6o and that Radid had
not cooperated with the Prosecutor of the Tribunal."1 In fact, as Meron
explicitly noted, "the only factor that weigh[ed] in favour of granting the
Request [was] the fact that Radid served two-thirds of his sentence."6"
There is a striking circularity involved in distilling the "similarly-situated
prisoners" factor into a standard for release at two thirds. As described above,
that standard would be equally satisfied by a policy that granted release at one
quarter, or one tenth, or never. By disregarding the other factors and rendering
this one dispositive, the President frees herself to establish whatever standards
she wishes, so long as she applies them consistently between prisoners. Her
only touchstone is domestic practice -and as the following Subsection argues,
the ICTY has seriously erred in its interpretation of domestic law.
Given the well-publicized and controversial generosity of the ICTY's early
release practice and the potential for disagreement within the judicial ranks,
have trial judges attempted to compensate with longer initial sentences? After
all, unless a defendant were to receive something near the maximum sentence,
a judge could deliver a sentence fifty percent longer than the one she would
have preferred in the absence of the two-thirds standard. (This theoretical
possibility is explored further in Section III.A.)
The ICTY Appeals Chamber rebuked the Trial Chamber for attempting
exactly this in the case of Dragan Nikolid. According to the Appeals Chamber,
the trial judgment "mechanically- not to say mathematically- gave effect to
the possibility of an early release," and therefore "attached too much weight to
58. Prosecutor v. Radi6, Case No. IT-9 8-3o/1-ES, Public Redacted Version of 13 February 2012
Decision of the President on Early Release of Mlado Radid, I 1, 3 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the




61. See id. 27 (noting that "there is no obligation on an accused or convicted person to
cooperate," and "therefore plac[ing] neither positive nor negative weight on this factor").
62. Id. 1 30.
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the possibility of an early release."3 The Appeals Chamber reduced Nikolid's
sentence accordingly.4
Without the ability to compensate for two-thirds release at the trial level,
the Presidents of the ICTY have effectively chopped away a third of every
sentence that the Tribunal delivers. Why has this group of jurists, presumably
as sensitive as anyone to the arguments of Prosecutors and the pleas of victim
groups, adopted such a generous policy as a matter of course? The answer lies
in the interaction between domestic and international law.
C. Confusion over Parole and Clemency
Recall that all of the ICTs' Statutes refer to "the applicable law of the State"
when-and only when-"the convicted person . . . is eligible for pardon or
commutation of sentence."65 The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTR
and ICTY similarly only contemplate "pardon or commutation."6 6 Pardon and
commutation (or, in the other official language of the Statutes, "[g]rice et
commutation de peine")6 7 are terms of art specifically referring to unconditional,
unsupervised release granted at the discretion of the executive." Nothing in
the comments of the UN Secretary-General, who drafted the early release
provision along with the rest of the ICTY Statute, suggests that he intended
anything other than the plain and well-established meaning of commutation
63. Prosecutor v. Nikolid, Case No. IT-94-2-A, Judgement on Sentencing Appeal, 5 97 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 4, 2005), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragan
nikolic/acjug/en/nik-jsao5O2o4e.pdf.
64. Id. at 44.
65. MICT Statute, supra note 36, art. 26 (emphasis added); ICTR Statute, supra note 35, art. 27
(emphasis added); ICTY Statute, supra note 36, art. 28 (emphasis added).
66. ICTR Rules, supra note 46, rules 124-26; ICTY Rules, supra note 36, rules 123-25; but see
MICT Rules, supra note 36, rules 149-51 (referring to "pardon, commutation of sentence,
and early release"). Note that the MICT Rules were drafted after the ICTR and ICTY had
already adopted early release procedures that blended parole and clemency together.
67. Statut Actualis6 du Tribunal Pnal International pour I'Ex-Yougoslavie [Updated Statute of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia] art. 28 (amended July 7,
2009), http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%2oLibrary/Statute/statutesepto9_fr.pdf.
68. See Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power from the
King, 69 TEX. L. REv. 569, 575-604 (1991); ACHILLE MORIN, Grace, Commutation de Peine, in
DICTIONNAIRE DU DRorr CRIMINEL 390 (1842); Jean-Paul Doucet, Grace, DICTIONNAIRE DE
DROIT CRIMINEL, http://ledroitcriminel.free.fr/dictionnairelettreg/lettre-ge.htm (last
visited May 30, 2013).
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and pardon.6 9 In fact, he considered and rejected a proposal by a committee of
French jurists for a system similar to parole. 70 This system -called "remise de
peine" -essentially mandates automatic early release for French prisoners
except in cases of misconduct.7' It is worrisome that the ICTY has now adopted
a system of early release so similar to the one that the drafter of the ICTY's
Statute explicitly rejected. Evidence from the drafting process indicates that a
conscious choice was made for the Statute to exclusively accommodate
executive clemency.
The Tribunals have partially respected this legislative intent, in that they
only award unconditional release.72 However, they have deviated by focusing
on domestic eligibility for parole rather than for commutation. The two-thirds
presumption followed by the Tribunals stems from the policy of most
enforcing states to allow prisoners to apply for parole after serving two thirds
of their sentence, at the latest.73
This matters because clemency is much rarer than parole in domestic law.
To see why, we will briefly consider national parole and clemency regimes in
more detail.
First, parole. Virtually all jurisdictions agree that "the primary justification
for parole is rehabilitation."74 Parole provides an incentive for inmates to
behave well and to participate in certain rehabilitative programs (job training
and church attendance, for example) ;75 it also overtly rewards demonstrated
rehabilitation in its criteria for early release.76
69. See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security
Council Resolution 8o8, Annex, art. 28, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993).
70. See Letter from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations to the
Secretary General, 9 157-59, U.N. Doc. S/25266 (Feb. 10, 1993).
71. Richard Malli6 et al., Halte aux Remises de Peine "Autonatiques," MONDE, Mar. 9, 2011,
http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2oil/03/09/halte-aux-remises-de-peine-automatiques
14904373232.html.
72. Provisional release is explicitly restricted to the period before and during trial; the judges
that formulated the Rules were apparently wary of the difficulty of monitoring parolee
behavior over the long term. See ICTR Rules, supra note 46, rule 65; ICTY Rules, supra note
36, rule 65; MICT Rules, supra note 36, rule 68. But see supra note 43.
73. See ULRICH SIEBER, MAX PLANCK INST. FOR FOREIGN & INT'L CRIMINAL LAW, THE
PUNISHMENT OF SERIOUS CRIMES: A COMPARATIvE ANALYSIS OF SENTENCING LAW AND
PRACTICE 83 fig.3 (2003).
74. 1 NEIL P. COHEN, THE LAw OF PROBATION AND PAROLE 23 (2d ed. 1999); see also CODE PNAL
[C. PAN.] art. 131-36-3 (Fr.); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972).
75. 1 COHEN, supra note 74, at 26.
76. MODEL PENAL CODE S 305.1 (2011); 2 COHEN, supra note 74, at 23-24.
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Somewhat less nobly, parole benefits the state fisc by reducing the prison
population. South Africa has launched a number of "special remissions
programmes" intended solely to reduce its prison population: the programmes
benefited approximately 65,000 prisoners in 2005 and 20o6,7 and 45,000
prisoners in 2012.78 Similarly, for much of its history, the French analog to
parole (la libiration conditionnelle) "was often used merely as a tool for prison
officials to ameliorate administrative problems such as overcrowding or budget
deficits." 79
Parole boards must be generous in order to achieve either of these goals.
The more widely parole is granted, the more likely prisoners are to take its
incentive effects seriously. Likewise, the more widely parole is granted, the
greater the savings to the penal system. Thus in 2011, the United States had
approximately 850,000 paroleesso compared to 1.6 million prisoners,s' despite
having abolished federal parole in 1984." Canada had 8,737 parolees, compared
to 14,419 prisoners;8 1 and virtually all Western nations have extensive
procedures governing conditional release.4
In contrast, clemency in national law is the exception rather than the rule.
Only two prisoners were granted clemency in Canada during 2011, a rate more
77. Francois Christiaan Marthinus Louw, The Parole Process from a South African Perspective i
(Nov. 2008) (unpublished M.A. dissertation, University of South Africa), http://
uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/105O0/1320/dissertation.pdf.
78. Special Remissions Project "Not Perfect," S. AFR. PRESS Ass'N (Sept. 13, 2012), http://
www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/Special-remissions-project-not-perfect-2o12o 9 13
79. Christopher L. Blakesley, Conditional Liberation (Parole) in France, 39 LA. L. REV. 1, 9 (1978).
But note that many countries have now moved away from cost savings as a motivation for
parole. See, e.g., id. at 3; Ivan Zinger, Conditional Release and Human Rights in Canada: A
Commentary, 54 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 117, 117-18, 120 (2012).
So. Laura M. Maruschak & Erika Parks, Probation and Parole in the United States, 2011, BUREAU
JUST. STAT. 3 (Nov. 2012), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppusiu.pdf
S. E. Ann Carson & William J. Sabol, Prisoners in 2011, BUREAU JUST. STAT. I (Dec. 2012),
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pii.pdf.
82. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 214 (b), 98 Stat. 1976,
2013.
83. For statistics from the 2011-2012 fiscal year, see PBC QuickStats, PAROLE BOARD CAN. (July
25, 2012), http://pbc-clcc.gc.ca/infocntr/factsh/parole stats-eng.shtml.
84. See, e.g., La Libiration Conditionnelle, MINISTARE JUST. (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.justice
.gouv.fr/prison-et-reinsertion-10036/la-vie-hors-detention-loo40/la-liberation-conditionnelle
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than a thousand times lower than the parole rate.s In the United States,
President Barack Obama has granted just thirty-nine presidential pardons since
taking office," and state governors have proved similarly reluctant to pardon
significant numbers of criminals.7
Clemency has historically allowed the executive to temper excessively harsh
standardized punishments" and to "perform[] a variety of important error-
correcting and justice-enhancing functions" -for example, a person convicted
of murder could be pardoned if the real murderer made a dying confession."9
This idea animates the modern policies of countries like Canada, which only
grants clemency where there is "clear and strong evidence of an error in law, of
excessive hardship and/or inequity, beyond that which could have been
foreseen at the time of the conviction and sentencing."9 o In other words,
clemency permits sentence adjustment based on changed circumstances. This
is exactly the rationale for early release that I endorse in Part II.9'
In sum, clemency and parole play very different roles in domestic law.
Nevertheless, the Presidents of the ICTs have relied heavily on factors that
classically appear in domestic parole hearings. The consideration of these
parole factors sometimes even eclipses the four factors explicitly set out in the
Tribunals' Rules. For example, the decision granting Miroslav Kvo6ka early
release 92 paid scant attention to his "particularly grave"93 crimes or the fact that
85. PBC QuickStats, supra note 83.
86. Clemency Statistics, U.S. DEP'T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/pardor/statistics.htm (last
visited Nov. 18, 2013).
87. Kathleen (Cookie) Ridolfi & Seth Gordon, Gubernatorial Clemency Powers: Justice or Mercy?,
24 CRIM. JUST. 26, 32 (2009).
88. THE FEDERALIST No. 74, at 501 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) ("The
criminal code of every country partakes so much of necessary severity, that without an easy
access to exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a countenance too
sanguinary and cruel.").
8g. Margaret Colgate Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, ioo J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1169, 1182-83 (2010).
go. PBC Policy Manual, PAROLE BOARD CAN. § 14.2.17 (Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.pbc-clcc.gc.ca
/infocntr/policym/PolicyManual.pdf. See generally David Tait, Pardons in Perspective: The
Role of Forgiveness in Criminal Justice, 13 FED. SENT'G REP. 134 (canvassing historical and
modern pardon policies in various countries).
91. This brief summary neglects some of the more cynical historical uses of clemency. Monarchs
in particular have often used clemency as a means to distribute personal favors or entrench
political power. See Kobil, supra note 68, at 583-89.
92. Prosecutor v. Kvo6ka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Decision on Application for Pardon or
Commutation of Sentence (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 30, 2005) (on
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he had not cooperated with the Prosecutor,94 and entirely omitted discussion of
remorse. President Meron instead emphasized Kvo6ka's "prior professional
integrity"95 and good behavior in prison:
Kvo6ka has shown good respect for management and staff and
complied with the Rules of detention and instructions of the guards. At
all times he has maintained cordial relations with his fellow detainees
and his physical and mental health is good. Kvo6ka's behaviour ...
persuades me that Kvo6ka has demonstrated a strong possibility of
rehabilitation.96
These criteria are astonishingly similar to the criteria that parole boards usually
apply,97 but not at all like those typical in pardon or commutation.98
Why have judges in the ICTs so conspicuously blurred the line between
clemency and parole? Two main possibilities present themselves.
First, the standards of parole may simply be easier to implement. Because
executive clemency is ad hoc and often politically motivated, 99 it does not lend
itself well to systematic application. Defaulting to parole may also have been
the most natural way to reconcile heterogeneous domestic early release
programs in enforcing states: one influential study commissioned by the ICTY
equated early release to parole, likely because it would have been nearly
impossible to survey clemency practice across different countries."oo Presidents
relying on this study and others like it could easily have slid from commutation
to parole without realizing the terminological shift.
Second, one might suspect that the Tribunals are merely echoing the
liberality of the enforcing states themselves. Of course, if no nation were






97. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 305.1 (2011); 2 COHEN, supra note 74, at 23-24.
9s. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
99. See Love, supra note 89, at 1195-204.
1oo. See SIEBER, supra note 73, at 84 & passim. The Sieber study was cited as a basis for sentencing
policy in, among other cases, Prosecutor v. Deronjid, Case No. IT-o2-61-S, Sentencing
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have to release her. As a result, no court lacking its own prisons could enforce
sentences longer than the maximum allowed in the most punitive enforcing
state. And crucially, if a tribunal started with a set of very liberal enforcing
states, it could not subsequently clamp down on early releases without
disadvantaging later defendants.
Can we explain the ICTY's generosity in these terms? As a factual matter,
probably not. At any given time, at least one of the ICTY's enforcing states has
always permitted life imprisonment without even the possibility of parole.
When the ICTY approved its first request for early release by Zlatko Aleksovski
in 2001,'0 the state holding that prisoner (Finland) permitted life sentences
without possibility of parole.o 2 At present, five other enforcing states still
sentence prisoners to life without parole.103 These domestic sentences are at
least as severe as any sentence that any international tribunal has the authority
to administer.o 4
Moreover, there is no evidence that Finland pressured the ICTY to release
Aleksovski in this case, or that it objected to the continued enforcement of his
sentence. (The sentence was a comparatively light seven years.o 5) If it did
object, the appropriate time to express concern would have been at the
initial negotiations to house convicts - Spain did so, for example, by refusing
to enforce sentences longer than twenty years, to conform to its domestic
penal policy."o'
1o. Aleksovski's Early Release, supra note 25, at 4.
102. Tapio Lappi-Seppilli, Imprisonment and Penal Policy in Finland, in 54 SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES
IN LAW 334, 346 (Folke Fredrik Schmidt ed., 2009), http://www.scandinavianlaw.se/pdf/54
-17.pdf. Finland applied this system of "preventive detention" only to "serious violent
recidivists." Id. at 346. Aleksovski posed little threat of recidivism, see generally infra Section
II.A (discussing how international criminals virtually never recidivate), but we can at least
infer that Finland was not squeamish about enforcing long sentences against prisoners in
serious cases. Certainly it would have had no qualms about enforcing Aleksovski's original
sentence of seven years. See Aleksovski's Early Release, supra note 25, at 2.
103. The five states are Albania, Slovakia, Sweden, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. Compare
Member States Cooperation, INT'L CRIM. TRIB. FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty
.org/sid/137 (last visited Dec. 4, 2013), with CONNIE DE LA VEGA ET AL., CRUEL AND UNUSUAL:
U.S. SENTENCING PRACTICES IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 27-29 (2012), http://www.usfca.edu
Aaw/docs/criminalsentencing.
104. Unlike the postwar tribunals, the ICTs may not impose the death penalty. Mary Margaret
Penrose, Lest We Fail: The Importance ofEnforcement in International Criminal Law, 15 AM. U.
INT'L L. REV. 321, 374 (1999).
105. Aleksovski's Early Release, supra note 25, at 2.
106. Richard Culp, Enforcement and Monitoring of Sentences in the Modern War Crimes
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But even assuming that Finland disagreed with the ICTY so strongly as to
threaten termination of enforcement rather than continuing to imprison
Aleksovski, it seems oddly lazy to simply release him rather than to search for
alternative arrangements. The ICTY could likely have found another state with
more permissive policies, or, as a last resort, simply held him in the ICTY's
Detention Unit in The Hague.o 7 If many nations were this unwilling to hold a
prisoner past her earliest eligibility date for parole, that would be a factor
arguing for a centralized international prison system rather than for a policy of
broad and automatic releases.
Given the lack of evidence suggesting reluctance to imprison, the political
obstacles that nations would face in advocating for the release of international
criminals, and the multitude of alternatives, it seems unlikely that the ICTY
had to release prisoners simply for lack of willing hosts. More likely, the
succeeding Presidents of the ICTY, saddled with the herculean task of applying
disparate penal philosophies to a formless body of law, instinctively drifted
toward the regularized parole procedures that they had already known to work
in their home countries.
Whatever the explanation, the substitution of parole eligibility for
commutation eligibility has had large practical consequences. Commutation is
granted much less regularly than parole in the domestic context; ios if left to
their own devices, enforcing states would virtually never recommend
unconditional release. The misapplication of domestic jurisprudence is thus
ultimately responsible for the creation of the two-thirds standard.
D. Looking Forward: The International Criminal Court and Other Tribunals
The ICC sentenced its first criminal, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, on July lo,
2012;o9 at the time of this writing, Lubanga's case was still pending appeal.1 o
Process: Equal Treatment Before the Law? ii (Apr. 7, 2011) (unpublished manuscript),
http://www.jjay.cuny.edu/CulpMonitoringTribunalPunishment-rev_9Aprli_-.pdf.
107. The Rome Statute explicitly authorizes imprisonment in The Hague as an alternative to
imprisonment in an enforcing state. Rome Statute, supra note lo, art. 103(4).
io8. See supra notes 77-87 and accompanying text.
iog. Press Release, Int'l Criminal Court, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Sentenced to 14 Years of
Imprisonment, ICC-CPI-2012o 71o-PR824 (July 1o, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/en-menus
/icc/press%2oand%20media/press%20releases/news%2oand%2ohighlights/Pages/pr824
.aspx.
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The ICC consequently has several more years before it will have to solidify its
early release policy by deciding an application. Similarly, the Special Court for
Sierra Leone (SCSL) sentenced its first criminal, Charles Taylor, on May 30,
2012,"' and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) has yet to pronounce any
sentences.n2 None of these Tribunals is formally bound by the jurisprudence of
the ICTs." 3 Each therefore has the opportunity to learn from the successes and
mistakes of these latter courts and adjust its early release practices accordingly.
Presently, the SCSL and STL seem happy to import the practices of the
older ad hoc courts without modification. The Statutes of both Tribunals set
out requirements for commutation and pardon that are functionally identical to
those of the earlier ad hoc tribunals,114 as are the requirements in their Rules of
Procedure and Evidence.115 The newer tribunals will probably interpret their
Statutes and Rules based on the jurisprudence of their older cousins.
The ICC carves out a different path. The Rome Statute - importantly,
adopted by treaty rather than by UN fiat-deviates significantly from the
Statutes of the ICTs in its treatment of sentence reduction. Like those of the ad
hoc tribunals, the ICC's Statute requires that "[t]he Court alone shall have the
right to decide any reduction of sentence,""' a requirement that is corroborated
by its agreements with enforcing states."7 However, its procedures for sentence
20cases/icc%200104%2001o6/Pages/democratic%2orepublic%200fb/o20the%20congo.aspx
(last visited Dec. 4, 2013).
im. Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Charles Taylor Sentenced to 50 Years in
Prison (May 30, 2012), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspxfileticket=wMFT32KRyiY%3d.
112. The Cases, SPECIAL TRIB. FOR LEB., http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/the-cases (last updated Oct. 7,
2013).
113. See, e.g., Situation in Uganda, Case No. ICC-02/04-ol/o5, Decision on the Prosecutor's
Position on the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I to Redact Factual Descriptions of Crimes
From the Warrants of Arrest, Motion for Reconsideration, and Motion for Clarification, 9
19 (Oct. 28, 2005).
114. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 23 (Jan. 16, 2002), http://www.sc
-sL.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=uClndiMJeEw/3d; Statute of the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon art. 30 (May 30, 2007), http://www.stl-tsl.org/index.php?option=com k2&view
=item&task=download&id=70_boeo787b205da709c7fd5d7ooc55f67b.
11s. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, rules 123-24, Special Ct. for Sierra Leone (May 31,
2012), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClickaspx?fileticket=Psp%2bFho%2bwSI%3d; Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, rules 194-96, Special Trib. for Leb. (Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.stl
-tsl.org/images/RPE/RPEENFebruary.2o12.pdf.
116. Rome Statute, supra note io, art. 110(2).
117. See, e.g., Agreement Between the International Criminal Court and the Government of the
Kingdom of Belgium on the Enforcement of Sentences of the International Criminal Court,
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review differ significantly from those of the other Tribunals. The Rome Statute
mandates review "[w]hen the person has served two thirds of the sentence, or
25 years in the case of life imprisonment.""' It also lays out a very different set
of factors:
1. The early and continuing willingness of the person to cooperate
with the Court in its investigations and prosecutions;
2. The voluntary assistance of the person in enabling the enforcement
of the judgements and orders of the Court in other cases, and in
particular providing assistance in locating assets subject to orders of
fine, forfeiture or reparation which may be used for the benefit of
victims; or
3. Other factors establishing a clear and significant change of
circumstances sufficient to justify the reduction of sentence, as
provided in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 9
The Rules contain several further departures from the practice of the ad hoc
tribunals. First, sentence reduction at the ICC is determined by a panel of three
judges, rather than unilaterally by the President. 2 o The Rules also enumerate
several additional criteria:
1. The conduct of the sentenced person while in detention, which
shows a genuine dissociation from his or her crime;
2. The prospect of the resocialization and successful resettlement of the
sentenced person;
3. Whether the early release of the sentenced person would give rise to
significant social instability;
4. Any significant action taken by the sentenced person for the benefit
of the victims as well as any impact on the victims and their families
Int'l Crim. Ct.-Belg., art. 12, June 1, 2010, ICC - PRES/o6 - o - 1o [hereinafter Agreement
on the Enforcement of Sentences], http://www.icc-cpi.inVNR/rdonlyres/9218659C-18 53
-4FE6-82D6-ECFD758512ED/282729/AgreementBelgiumEng.pdf.
118. Rome Statute, supra note lo, art. 110(3).
ii. Id. art. 110(4).
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as a result of the early release;
5. Individual circumstances of the sentenced person, including a
worsening state of physical or mental health or advanced age.1 2 1
Some of these factors are very reasonable, particularly the two laid out in the
Rome Statute. On the other hand, a couple of the factors in the Rules -most
notably "the conduct of the sentenced person while in detention" and "the
prospect of . . . resocialization and successful resettlement" - have little place in
early release jurisprudence. The ICC should also take care not to transform the
two-thirds eligibility standard into a two-thirds presumption of release, as the
ICTs have done.
Because these more problematic factors are articulated solely within the
Rules and not by the Rome Statute, the ICC may still redraw them before they
become entrenched by actual use. Similarly, although the SCSL and STL will
be guided by the standards set by the earlier ad hoc tribunals, they too would
benefit from careful analysis of their criteria, as I lay out in the following Part.
II. A THEORY OF EARLY RELEASE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Early release is most useful as a means to respond to changed
circumstances. When new information comes to light casting doubt on the
defendant's guilt;m when the defendant provides assistance to the Prosecutor
that had not been accounted for at trial;2 3 when the tribunal is unable to
provide adequate care for sick or elderly prisoners'24 -in these cases, early
release allows the tribunal to adjust sentences in the interests of justice.
But there is no reason why unconditional early release should be granted as
a matter of course. If the ICTY feels that a defendant deserves twenty years in
prison, it should sentence her to twenty years -not sentence her to thirty years
and then release her after two thirds of that time. The latter policy shortens the
maximum term available to the Tribunal in probable violation of the intent of
its founders. It also makes international criminal law more confusing to
observers and angers victims groups, who do not understand why the Tribunal
opts to release prisoners early despite lack of remorse for their crimes.
121. Id. rule 223.
122. See Love, supra note 89, at 1183.
123. See infra Subsection II.B.i.
124. See infra Subsection II.B.2.
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This Note thus makes an appeal to readers regardless of whether they
believe that overall sentences are too harsh or lenient. Perhaps Mlado Radid
deserved to have spent only thirteen years in prison, and early release at
thirteen years was a fairer outcome than having him serve the twenty years to
which he was originally sentenced. In such a case, the fairest and most
transparent policy would have been to initially sentence him to thirteen years.
And if the President's assessment of just deserts differs from that of the trial
and appeals chambers, it is difficult to argue that her judgment should
substitute for theirs.
Unfortunately, the ICTs have made no attempt to separate pre- and post-
sentencing factors. For example, the President of the ICTY has held guilty
pleas to constitute remorse for the purposes of the Tribunal's four factors,1 25
despite the fact that the guilty pleas had already resulted in substantial sentence
121reductions.12
In this Part, I distinguish factors that ought and ought not to figure into
early release decisions ("relevant" and "irrelevant" factors, respectively). A key
commonality among the relevant factors is that they involve changed
circumstances - tribunals should act only upon new information that was not
available at trial.
A. The Goals ofInternational Criminal Law
As a prelude to analysis of early release factors, we should consider the
underlying goals of international criminal law. In particular, we should
consider the ways in which those goals differ from the goals of domestic
criminal law, and by implication the ways in which international early release
should differ from domestic parole. Commentators do not uniformly agree on
the aims of international justice; nevertheless, I will briefly summarize the
attitudes of the tribunals' founders as well as the current scholarly
conversation.
The four most popularly accepted purposes of international criminal law
are deterrence, retribution, expressive condemnation, and reconciliation. The
125. See Prosecutor v. Dogen, Case No. IT-95-8-S, Order of the President on the Early Release of
Damir Dogen 3-4 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2003) [hereinafter
Dolen's Early Release], http://www.icty.org/x/cases/sikirica/presord/en/030228.pdf;
Plaviid's Early Release, supra note 3, 8.
iz6. See Press Release, Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Dusko Sikirica and
Damir Dosen (sic] Enter Guilty Pleas, UN Press Release SP/ P.I.S./ 620-e (Sept. 19, 2001),
http://www.icty.org/sid/7953; supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
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first two, deterrence and retribution, have particularly stood out in the
historical record. From the Nuremberg Trials'1 7 to the establishment of the
ICC,2 8 commentators have emphasized the ability of international law to
prevent future crimes and satisfy the demands of justice. 9 The ICTY has
observed that it and the ICTR "have consistently pointed out that two of the
main purposes of sentencing ... are deterrence and retribution." 30
Deterrence is simply the consequentialist argument that punishment will
discourage people from committing crimes -in theory, both deterring that
specific criminal from recidivism (specific deterrence) and deterring others by
making an example of her (general deterrence).' 3 ' Deterrence has always
loomed large in international criminal law: " [F]or many, deterrence is the most
important justification, and the most important goal." 32
As distinct from deterrence, retribution serves multiple purposes.
Retribution underlies the classic lex talionis, eye-for-an-eye rationale for
punishment that permeated ancient legal codes.133 Alternatively, retribution
127. F.B. Schick, The Nuremberg Trial and the International Law of the Future, 41 AM. J. INT'L L.
770, 770 (1947).
128. Gerard E. O'Connor, Note, The Pursuit of Justice and Accountability: Why the United States
Should Support the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 927,
972-74 (1999), cited in David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International
Justice, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 473, 473 n.2 (1999).
12g. But see Wippman, supra note 128 (arguing that little concrete evidence suggests that
international criminal law has effectively deterred crimes).
130. Prosecutor v. Delalid (('elebidi case), Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgement, 5 8o6 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001) [hereinafter Delalid Judgment], http://
www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/acjug/en/cel-ajoxo220.pdf (footnotes omitted); Prosecutor v.
Deronji6, Case No. IT-o2-61-A, Judgement on Sentencing Appeal, 5 136 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia July 20, 2005), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/deronjic/acjug/en
/der-ajoso720.pdf (quoting Delali6 Judgment, supra, I 806); see also Prosecutor v.
Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Judgement, 185 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2000), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/aleksovski/acjug/en/ale
-asjoo0324e.pdf (noting the importance of deterrence and retribution, but warning that
deterrence "must not be accorded undue prominence in the overall assessment of the
sentences to be imposed on persons convicted by the International Tribunal" (quoting
Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-A and IT-94-1-A bis, Judgement in Sentencing
Appeals, 48 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 26, 2000),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-asjoool26e.pdf)).
131. Wippman, supra note 128, at 476.
132. Id. at 474.
133. See Richard A. Posner, Retribution and Related Concepts ofPunishment, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 71, 71
(1980).
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may relieve the international community of what Kant calls "blood guilt"
(Blutschuld)' - that is, the complicity that would come of ignoring crimes.
Under this theory, society simply has a moral obligation to punish bad acts.
Retributivism motivates oft-heard demands to "bring criminals to justice," and
policies like amnesty for warlords are controversial because they feel like a
subversion of that justice. 3 s
This approach to retribution relates to the expressive function of
international criminal law. The idea of condemnation has long played an
important rhetorical role, even as early as the Nuremberg Tribunals.136 More
recently, the ICTY has stated that retribution "is not to be understood as
fulfilling a desire for revenge but as duly expressing the outrage of the
international community."137 Condemnation also gives voice to the victims of
serious crimes by publicly recognizing their suffering. This was a theme
reiterated in Security Council meetings leading up to the establishment of the
ICTY.' 8 Many commentators now regard expression as the primary role of
international criminal justice. 3 9
Finally, criminal law can reconcile former enemies by isolating the parties
responsible for conflicts. This prevents vengeful publics from attributing guilt
to entire populations and provides an outlet for wartime frustrations.
Historically speaking, one of the major benefits of the Nuremberg and Tokyo
134. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 142 (Mary Gregor trans., 1991).
135. This argument was leveled in various forms during the fight over whether to grant amnesty
to Joseph Kony, trading off retributivist justice for peace. See generally Robert Feldman,
A Deal with the Devil: Issues in Offering Joseph Kony Amnesty to Resolve the Conflict in
Uganda, 18 SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 134 (2007), http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil
/documents/Kony-Amnesty.pdf.
136. See Robert H. Jackson, Chief of Counsel for the United States, Int'l Military Trib.,
Opening Statement before the International Military Tribunal (Nov. 21, 1945),
http://www.roberthjackson.org/the-man/speeches-articles/speeches/speeches-by-robert-h
-jackson/opening-statement-before-the -international-military-tribunal.
137. Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-9 5-14/i-A, Judgement, 185 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2000), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/aleksovski/acjug/en/ale
-asj000324e.pdf (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted).
138. U.N. SCOR, 4 7th Sess., 3 217 th mtg. at 12-13, 17, 28, 34-35, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217 (May 25,
1993).
139. See Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The Limits of the
National Law Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law, 43 STAN. J. INT'L L. 39
(2007); see also Alex Geisinger & Michael Ashley Stein, A Theory of Expressive International
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Trials may have been the speed with which the Allies, West Germany, and
Japan were subsequently able to reconcile their differences and align against
the Soviet Bloc. 4o
On the other hand, there are some generally accepted goals of domestic law
that international tribunals do not pursue. The most important of these are
crime prevention and cost cutting. Domestic prisons prevent crime by
incapacitating criminals and, in theory at least, by rehabilitating them. This
matters because recidivism rates can be very high in domestic criminal law: one
study across fifteen U.S. states reported that 46.9% of the prisoners in its
sample were reconvicted within three years of their release. 41 Incarceration
therefore serves the important interest of promoting public safety.
In contrast, international convicts typically have neither the motive nor the
means to reoffend. The prototypical international defendant is a former high-
ranking political leader, often very old, who has been removed from power and
stands virtually no chance of regaining it.'" Even with regard to rank-and-file
international criminals, the conditions that initially motivated and permitted
their crimes have almost always disappeared by the time of their trial, whether
those conditions were concentration camps or oppressive military regimes. The
rehabilitation of international convicts therefore does not affect public safety.
Between their inability to regain their former power, increased international
scrutiny that accompanies criminal conviction, and changed political
circumstances, it is difficult to imagine recidivism in international criminal law.
This is not to say that courts should not attempt to prevent international
crimes before they occur - indeed, the ICTY and ICC have made inroads in the
140. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
141. Patrick A. Langan & David J. Levin, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994, 15 FED. SENT'G
REP. 58, 59 tbl.2 (2002); see also MEGAN JONES & TONY STREVELER, Wis. DEP'T CORR.,
REcIDIvisM AFTER RELEASE FROM PRISON 4 (2o12), http://cdn.wrn.com/wp-content
/uploads/2022/io/Recidivismlo2412.pdf (finding that recidivism rates in Wisconsin from
1993 to 2007 ranged between 32.4% and 4S.3%).
142. The only exceptions that I am aware of occurred after the largely discredited Tokyo Trials:
Nobusuke Kishi, Mamoru Shigemitsu, and Okinori Kaya returned to power after their
convictions. R. John Pritchard, The International Military Tribunal for the Far East and Its
Contemporary Resonances, 149 MiL. L. REv. 25, 35 (1995). Note, however, that ex-convicts
occasionally retain unofficial influence upon release. Many criminals convicted by the ICTY
are feted as heroes when they return home. See, e.g., Bosnian Serbs Welcome Freed War
Criminal, AL JAZEERA, Aug. 30, 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2o13
/o8/2o1383oo3137245488.html ("Singing Serbian national songs and waving flags, more
than 2,000 people have welcomed convicted war criminal Momcilo Krajisnik [sic] home as a
national hero."); supra notes 1-21 (telling the story ofBiljana Plaviii).
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prosecution of war criminals in ongoing conflicts. But when tribunals have
managed to change the course of a conflict, they have done so almost
exclusively through the initial indictment. For example, the ICTY's indictment
against Radovan Karadiid prevented him from attending the Dayton Peace
Talks,'43 and its indictment against Slobodan Milogevid arguably facilitated
Serbia's transition to democracy by removing him from his Yugoslavian sphere
of influence.'1 "
Even this much interference with criminals still in power has been
controversial. Indictment may inadvertently give the indictee some sort of
notoriety-driven cachet;14s it threatens politically motivated abuse;'+4 it can
discourage leaders from agreeing to peace deals that would expose them to
criminal prosecution;'47 and it may raise additional concerns of national
sovereignty compared to the indictment of unseated leaders. So crime
prevention is an uncertain goal of international law in the context of ongoing
conflicts. It is even more tenuous in the context of early release: by the time
that a court considers whether to set a prisoner free, the only factor with any
implications for crime control is recidivism. Thus crime prevention should
affect early release only if conditions amenable to further crimes still persist in
the criminal's home country, and if the court feels that she could relapse if set
free - these conditions occur in an infinitesimal minority of cases.
Likewise, international tribunals may completely disregard the fiscal
concerns that animate much of domestic parole policy. As discussed above,
parole has sometimes been used as a means to cut costs, or at least to reduce
the prisoner population to suit the penal system's limited resources.'**
International penology suffers from no such budgetary constraints. Modern
international tribunals make agreements for the costs of detention to be borne
143. Carsten Stahn, The Future of International Criminal Justice, HAGUE JUST. PORTAL 7 (2oo9),
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/Commentaries%2oPDF/StahnTheFuture%200f
%2olnternational%20JusticeEN.pdf.
144. Diane F. Orentlicher, Shrinking the Space for Denial: The Impact of the ICTY in Serbia,
OPEN Soc'Y JUST. INrrlATIVE 42 (May 20o8), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid
/ 4 cdcebel2.pdf.
145. See Stahn, supra note 143, at 7.
146. See Daniel Saxon, The Legitimacy and Limits of "Incapacitation": A Response to Carsten Stahn,
HAGUE JUST. PORTAL 1-2 (2009), http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/Commentaries
%2oPDF/Saxon The%2oLegitimacyo/%2oand%2oLimits%200f/2olncapacitationEN.pdf.
147. See Anthony D'Amato, Peace v. Accountability in Bosnia, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 500, 500-01
(1994)-
148. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
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by enforcing states rather than the tribunals themselves,'" 9 and the enforcing
states have strong reputational reasons to care for prisoners attentively. Even if
the tribunals were to reimburse enforcing states for the costs of detention or to
bear the costs themselves, the effect on their bottom lines would pale in
comparison to the judicial salaries, administration fees, and facilities costs that
make up the lion's share of their budgets. 50
As we will see, divergence between the goals of international law and
domestic law has broad implications for early release policy: international law
generally focuses on high-level issues like condemnation and reconciliation,
rather than quotidian concerns like crime prevention and cost-cutting. The
international emphasis on symbolism conflicts with the idea of presumptive
early release. As Section III.A discusses, early release muffles the censure of the
initial sentence, implying that the prisoner no longer deserves further
punishment. The fact that this perceived reduction in deserts need not be tied
to any actions on the part of the prisoner confuses the message of international
criminal law; it also makes reconciliation more difficult- by inflaming survivors
and making the process of international justice seem arbitrary.
B. Relevant Factors
1. Cooperation After Sentencing
In a world of scarce resources, early release can ease the burden on
Prosecutors by providing an ongoing incentive for convicts to cooperate with
tribunals. This cooperation can take a number of forms. For example, a convict
could testify against other criminals,"' or she could help the court to locate and
confiscate assets that could then be used to compensate victims.'52
149. See, e.g., Agreement on the Enforcement of Sentences, supra note 117, art. 18.
15o. Annual costs for the ad hoc tribunals have regularly run into the hundreds of millions of
dollars. David Wippman, The Costs of International Justice, 1oo AM. J. INT'L L. 861, 861
(20o6). Almost all of this money goes toward trial and administrative costs. Id. at 864-78.
151. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Jokid, Case No. IT-ol-42/1-ES, Decision of the President on Request
for Early Release, 99 9, 15 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 1, 20o8)
(weighing the testimony of Miodrag Joki6 against Pavle Strugar in the decision for early
release).
152. This was one of the criteria for early release contemplated in the Rome Statute. See Rome
Statute, supra note 1o, art. n1o(4)(b). The ICTs do not fine criminals or compensate victims
and therefore do not reward this form of cooperation.
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The crucial point in either case is that a convict should only be rewarded for
cooperation that she provides after trial. Any assistance provided to the
Prosecutor before sentencing -guilty pleas, testimony against others, voluntary
surrender, etc. -should have been taken into account in the initial sentence. As
discussed above, the ICTY routinely double-counts guilty pleas both in
sentencing and in early release deliberations; under the four factors, the guilty
plea is treated both as evidence of remorse 53 and as cooperation with the
Prosecutor.154 This double-counting is unintuitive and therefore less
transparent to lay observers than a one-time reduction in sentence. Although
double-counting could theoretically result in equivalent sentences to single-
counting by reducing the rewards of cooperation at sentencing (a move of
questionable legality under the Nikolid rule 55), the relative uncertainty of
double-counting benefits no one. From the Prosecutor's perspective, early
release will only incentivize cooperation if defendants can rely on the general
policy to grant early release to prisoners who have cooperated before
sentencing. Such a system of incentives would take a considerable number of
"free" initial releases to become credible, which would irk a Prosecutor who
sought to maximize sentences. From the defendant's perspective, early release
based on pre-sentencing cooperation is uncertain and dependent upon the
personal philosophy of the tribunal's President. She would naturally prefer a
guaranteed sentence reduction to a vague promise of early release. So trading
pre-trial prosecutorial cooperation for early release is not only opaque and
confusing, but a pretty bad deal for all parties to boot.
153. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Case No. IT-95-8-ES, Decision of President on Early Release
of Dugko Sikirica, 17 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 21, 2010),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/sikirica/presdec/en/1oo721.pdf.
154. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Zelenovid, Case No. IT-96-23/2-ES, Decision of President on Early
Release of Dragan Zelenovid, 21 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30,
2012), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/zelenovic/presdec/en/121130.pdf; Prosecutor v. Rajid,
Case No. IT-95-12-ES, Decision of President on Early Release of Ivica Rajid, 5 23 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 22, 2011) [hereinafter Rajid's Early Release]. But
see Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-i-ES, Decision of the President on the Application
for Pardon or Commutation of Sentence of Dugko Tadid 18 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia July 17, 2008), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/presdec/en/o8o717.pdf
(public redacted version) (declining to double-count cooperation with the prosecutor
because it was already accounted for at sentencing).
155. See supra note 63-64 and accompanying text.
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2. Humanitarian Concerns
Insofar as fairness demands humane conditions of imprisonment, another
major motivation for early release will be inadequate prison facilities,
particularly for old or sick prisoners. Humane treatment is an obvious ethical
imperative; moreover, adequate care for defendants and convicts is important
for the continuing political viability of international tribunals. Accusations of
mistreatment following the death of former Yugoslavian President Slobodan
Milogevi6 (including claims that he had been poisoneds6 ) underscored the
need for international justice to be beyond reproach. The high profiles of
international criminal defendants make tribunals particularly vulnerable to
accusations of abuse.
This may explain the relative commonness of early release in international
law relative to domestic practice. Three out of the seven criminals at the high-
profile Nuremberg Trials were released early for old age or ill health;'5s
similarly, the ICTY often considers old age in its early release decisions.5
In contrast, few countries systematically release elderly or ill prisoners
simply because of their age or health. In the United States, " [s]ince 1992, the
annual average number of prisoners who received compassionate release has
been less than two dozen."' 59 The government of the United Kingdom has
been similarly reluctant to release prisoners on compassionate grounds."6 o Both
countries grant compassionate release only at the discretion of the national
government,' which for political reasons may be skittish about showing
sympathy for convicts.
156. Milosevic [sic] Found Dead in His Cell, BBC NEWS, Mar. 11, 20o6, http://news
.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4796470.stm. See generally JUDGE KEVIN PARKER, VICE
-PRESIDENT, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: DEATH OF SLOBODAN MLO EvI 3 (May 20o6),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan-milosevic/custom2/en/parkerreport.pdf
157. The three were Walther Funk, Konstantin von Neurath, and Erich Raeder. Karl D6nitz,
Baldur von Schirach, and Albert Speer served their full sentences, and Rudolf Hess died in
prison. TELFORD TAYLOR, ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR 616-
18 (1992).
158. See, e.g., Plavgi's Early Release, supra note 3, H.
159. The Answer Is No: Too Little Compassionate Release in US Federal Prisons, HUM. RTS. WATCH
& FAMs. AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS 2 (NOV. 2012), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default
/files/reports/usIli2ForUploadSm.pdf.
16o. Eva Steiner, Early Release for Seriously Ill and Elderly Prisoners: Should French Practice Be
Followed?, 50 PROBATION J. 267, 268 (2003) (recounting the Home Secretary's refusal to
grant compassionate release in two high-profile cases).
161. Criminal justice Act, 1991, c. 53, § 36 (U.K.); TheAnswer Is No, supra note 159, at 2.
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An outlier is France's 2002 rule that allowed for the release of prisoners
whose "state of health is incompatible with long-term imprisonment,"
regardless of time served or crime committed.12 But this move was notably
controversial -for instance, the application of the policy to the case of
ninety-two-year-old Vichy war criminal Maurice Papon drew criticism from
within France and without.6 3 An international tribunal would probably draw
similar flak for the humanitarian release of prisoners who had committed
comparable crimes.
Where should such tribunals stand between these various policy options?
Naturally, the need for compassionate release will depend on conditions of
imprisonment and the capacity for the prison to provide treatment. Inadequate
facilities pose a strong case for early release; on the other hand, it is difficult to
argue that there is some sort of entitlement to early release based on old age
alone. Even terminally ill prisoners (categorically eligible for release under the
French system'4) have no obvious right to die with their families rather than
dying in prison. Depriving prisoners of contact with their families is a
necessary and intentional part of incarceration.
Plainly, individual cases will vary, and the President will have to exercise a
fair amount of discretion. Nonetheless, the economics of imprisonment
suggest that international tribunals should on average be more conservative in
granting early release than domestic ones. Elderly prisoners cost approximately
three times more to incarcerate than average inmatessis and therefore strain the
resources of domestic prisons.166 In contrast, as discussed in Section II.A,
international tribunals may spend freely on medical care for their prisoners.
Inmates at the famously luxurious United Nations Detention Unit (also known
as the "Hague Hilton") receive "top-notch medical care,"16 7 including extensive
162. CODE DE PROCtDURE PtNALE [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE], art. 720-1-1 (Fr.) (translated
by author).
163. See Jon Henley, Papon Release Prompts Healthy Skepticism, GUARDIAN, Oct. 3, 2002,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/20o2/oct/o3/worlddispatch.france.
164. Id.
165. Jason S. Ornduff, Releasing the Elderly Inmate: A Solution to Prison Overcrowding, 4 ELDER L.J.
173, 175 & n.16 (1996).
166. See Nancy Neveloff Dubler, The Collision of Confinement and Care: End-of-Life Care in Prisons
and Jails, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 149, 151 (1998); Jeff Yates & William Gillespie, The Elderly
and Prison Policy, 11 J. AGING & SOC. POL'Y 167, 170-71 (2000). Ornduff, Yates, and Gillespie
all point to early release for the elderly as a possible source of cost savings. Ornduff, supra
note 165; Yates & Gillespie, supra, at 172-74.
167. Rachel Irwin, Inside the "Hague Hilton," INST. FOR WAR& PEACE REPORTING (Dec. 19, 2013),
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attention from local medical specialists and even transportation to foreign
specialists as needed. 68 It is difficult to conceive of circumstances in which
prisoners would require treatment that could only be obtained through
early release.
C. Irrelevant Factors
This Part has argued that early release should be motivated exclusively by
changed circumstances. But that is not to say that any new information should
qualify -there are several kinds of new information that tribunals still ought
not to take into account, including various factors more commonly seen in
domestic parole hearings. My analysis of these factors is underpinned by the
contrast between the goals of domestic and international law.
1. Rehabilitation: Remorse, Recidivism, Good Behavior, and Reintegration
As Part I discusses, the ICTs and the ICC apply several factors in early
release deliberations that might broadly be considered proxies for
rehabilitation: remorse, risk of recidivism, good behavior, and potential for
reintegration. Rehabilitation does not tell the whole story-for instance,
expressions of remorse may hasten reconciliation, and good behavior may
reduce costs-but it will be helpful in our analysis to understand why
international tribunals have seen fit to encourage rehabilitation in early release
policy, particularly since it was not one of the generally accepted principles of
international law discussed in Section II.A.
Theorists generally see rehabilitation through either a consequentialist or a
humanitarian lens. On the consequentialist view, rehabilitation is a purely
instrumental means to the ends of crime prevention and economic prosperity:
by "mak[ing] 'honest citizens' of former offenders, rehabilitative practices not
only maximize the availability of useful, contributing members of society, but
also protect society from future crime . . . ."169 But as Section II.A notes,
neither crime prevention nor economics is an important consideration in
international law. So consequentialist rehabilitation is a poor fit for
international early release policy.
http://iwpr.net/report-news/inside-hague-hilton.
168. See PARKER, supra note 156, 40-94.
169. GWEN ROBINSON & IAIN CROW, OFFENDER REHABILITATION: THEORY, RESEARCH AND
PRACTICE 10 (2009).
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On the humanitarian view, prisoners have something like a right to
rehabilitation. The theory is that criminal misconduct stems from moral
underdevelopment, which is a failing of the state rather than a failing of the
individual. Thus convicts have a right to rehabilitation in the same way that
they have a right to basic education, as one of the privileges of citizenship. Put
another way, criminals are not morally blameworthy so much as they are sick.
They suffer from a kind of cognitive dysfunction that can and should be
remedied by proper treatment.17o
Humanitarian rehabilitation is controversial, in part because it seems to
abrogate individual responsibility, and in part because rehabilitation is difficult
to achieve in practice."' For these reasons, the United States has in the past half
century drifted away from the "rehabilitative ideal" and back toward
retributivism."' Nevertheless, humanitarian rehabilitation still retains some
currency abroad. European countries in particular often recognize a right to
rehabilitation as a subsidiary obligation of the welfare state'73- for example, the
German constitutional principle of the Sozialstaat74 demands that "the
community must help prisoners with less-than-optimal social development to
encourage their flourishing within society."s75
But there is no international Sozialstaat, nor any generally recognized right
to rehabilitation in international law.76 Indeed, the influential 1955 United
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners - passed
when the rehabilitative ideal was at peak popularity-explicitly took the
170. Id. at 3-5, 9. A particularly famous advocate of this view in the United States was Francis
Allen. See Francis A. Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, So J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 226 (1959).
171. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 365 (1989) ("Rehabilitation as a sound
penological theory came to be questioned and, in any event, was regarded by some as an
unattainable goal for most cases.").
172. See generally FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY
AND SOCIAL PURPOSE (1981).
173. See EDGARDO ROTMAN, BEYOND PUNISHMENT: A NEw VIEw OF THE REHABILITATION OF
CRIMINAL OFFENDERS 76 & n.76 (1990).
174. See GRUNDGESETZ FOR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC
LAw], May 23, 1949, BGBI. I, arts. 20, 28 (Ger.).
175. Amanda Ploch, Note, Why Dignity Matters: Dignity and the Right (or Not) to Rehabilitationfrom International and National Perspectives, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 887, 913 (2012).
176. The European Convention on Human Rights and the 1955 United Nations Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners both discuss rehabilitation, but do not treat
it as a right. See id. at 917-22.
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consequentialist view by declaring that "[t]he purpose and justification of a
sentence of imprisonment or a similar measure deprivative of liberty is
ultimately to protect society against crime.""7
Even assuming a right to rehabilitation, early release as actually practiced
by international tribunals bears only an attenuated relationship to that right.
Historically, unsupervised release has virtually never been used as a
rehabilitative tool" 8 : while it is conceivable that freeing those who express
remorse might incentivize such remorse, it is much easier to imagine prisoners
simply making disingenuous gestures of reform in order to win their freedom,
as Plavgi did. Even a prisoner who maintained the fagade up to the moment of
her release would be free to retract past remorse under the usual unconditional
terms of early release. An international tribunal would have no capacity to
monitor such a prisoner or to impose the kind of conditions on parole that are
meant to encourage rehabilitation. And even supervised parole has come under
fire for its questionable ability to effect real rehabilitation. 79
So it seems that neither the consequentialist nor the humanitarian
approaches fully explain the centrality of rehabilitation in early release doctrine.
But let us rephrase the question: why should international tribunals keep
convicts locked up even after they have reformed? Doesn't respect for the
autonomy of the prisoner require us to give her a second chance if she has
changed her ways?
The discussion above implies that rehabilitation makes no difference,
insofar as rehabilitation did not motivate incarceration in the first place. If
international tribunals only convicted criminals who posed an ongoing threat,
the Hague Hilton would be practically empty. Similarly, if international
tribunals took the resocialization of criminals seriously, they would centralize
enforcement of sentences rather than farming them out across countries that
177. United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, 1955,
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment ofPrisoners, E.S.C. Res. 1957/663C (XXIV), 5 58,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF/61i (July 31, 1957), http://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal-justice/UN
StandardMinimumRulesfor the Treatment of Prisoners.pdf.
178. See Kobil, supra note 68, at 575-83 (listing non-rehabilitative functions of unsupervised
release); Love, supra note 89, at 1183 (same).
179. See COHEN, supra note 74, at 34 ("Moreover, there is no conclusive evidence that [probation
and parole] result in the rehabilitation of offenders."); Jeremy Travis, But They All Come
Back: Rethinking Prisoner Reentry, SENT'G & CORRECTIONs, May 2000, at 3 & n.5,
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesi/nij/181413.pdf.
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differ significantly in their philosophies of rehabilitation,So and they would
encourage community reintegration through supervised parole rather than
unconditional clemency. Thus the essential structure of incarceration and early
release in international criminal law leaves little role for rehabilitation. We
might think that this structure is misguided; yet if we limit ourselves to work
within it, we must seriously doubt the role of remorse, recidivism risk, good
behavior, and reintegration in early release deliberations.
Setting aside rehabilitation, can we explain these factors through other
goals of international criminal law? Probably not. Probabilities of recidivism
and reintegration are merely proxies for rehabilitative aims. Good behavior has
an element of cost savings, insofar as including it as a factor encourages
prisoners to behave themselves in prison; but as discussed above, tribunals
need not generally be sensitive to the costs of imprisonment.
The only remaining factor is remorse. Arguably, apologies from war
criminals can aid reconciliation and help victims obtain closure with respect to
conflicts. Yet reconciliation is a largely empirical question, and as a matter of
fact, remorse does not seem to achieve it. An unpleasant lesson of the ICTY so
far has been that genuine remorse is difficult to determine, and that offering
dramatic sentence reductions in exchange for shows of remorse is unlikely to
inspire actual changes of heart.'"' Moreover, victims often reject apologies even
when they have been accepted by courts,"' and early release correspondingly
damages reconciliation by sparking criticism from victims' advocates.8" On the
whole, undue emphasis on remorse seems to do more harm to reconciliation
than good.
In sum, international tribunals err when they borrow rehabilitative factors
from the law of parole. Rehabilitation is only a marginal concern of
international criminal law; the damage to the expressive and reconciliatory
iso. See Ploch, supra note 175, at 911-17, 933-39 (comparing Germany and the United Kingdom,
both of which enforce sentences for the ICTY, see Member States Cooperation, supra note 103).
181. See supra notes 1-21 and accompanying text (describing the case of Biljana Plavgid).
182. For example, contrast the public response to Biljana Plaviid's early release with the ICTY's
enthusiastic endorsement of her rehabilitation. Compare supra notes 20-21 and
accompanying text, with Plavgi's Early Release, supra note 3, f 8-9 (approving of Plavgi's
expressions of remorse).
183. See, e.g., Aida Cerkez-Robinson, Bosnian President Angry over War Criminal Release,
SEATTLE TiMEs, Oct. 28, 20o9, http://seattletimes.com/html/nationworld/2olo153o76
apeuwarcrimesplavsic.html; Karuhanga, supra note 27; Duian Stojanovid, Bosnian Serb Ex-
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content of sentences far outweighs any consequentialist or humanitarian
benefits.
2. Social Instability
The ICC has proved somewhat more sensitive than the ICTs to the political
effects of early release. Its Rules include another factor closely linked to
reconciliation: "Whether the early release of the sentenced person would give
rise to significant social instability."1S4 This social instability could result from
public outrage over early release, as in Plavgid's case,' or alternatively from the
prisoner's encouragement of bad acts by others after release.
The philosophy behind this rule strikes at the heart of fairness concerns in
international criminal law. To punish a prisoner for the social instability that
she causes is to punish her based on factors beyond her control -under the
ICC's approach, two convicts who committed crimes of equal gravity could
receive unequal treatment solely because one of them received more press than
the other.
Moreover, the expressive value of a theoretically objective judgment is
somewhat diluted if its enforcement depends on public opinion. As some
delegations to the Rome Statute conference pointed out, the proper role of an
international judiciary is to administer agreed-upon penalties for agreed-upon
crimes, not to make amorphous political determinations, even in the service of
reconciliation.'
Naturally, each international tribunal must strike its own balance between
political concerns and equity in sentencing. But the social instability factor at
least raises serious questions about fairness and expressive law for the ICC
to answer.
3. Gravity of Crimes
Finally, the gravity of crimes is another factor that pits the obligations of
international law against the rights of defendants. The gravity of a prisoner's
184. ICC Rules, supra note 120, rule 223(c).
185. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
186. See Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Rules of Procedure and
Evidence 99 n.89, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2ooo/L.i/Rev.1/Add.x (Apr. 10, 2000), http://www
.iccnow.org/documents/Annex2_reviadle.pdf.
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crimes is already accounted for at sentencing- thus it does not constitute the
sort of changed circumstance that merits early release. Just as a guilty plea
should not be double-counted in favor of a criminal, the severity of her crimes
should not be double-counted against her.
At the national level, judges sometimes solve this problem with sentences
that preclude the possibility of parole.8 This allows them to designate crimes
considered so heinous that even complete rehabilitation should not give rise to
release.
No equivalent difficulty arises at the international level -under my theory,
rehabilitation alone does not suffice, nor remorse, nor the inability to commit
future crimes. The only way that a prisoner may be released before she serves
her full sentence is by furnishing significant cooperation to the tribunal, or if
the tribunal can no longer provide humane conditions of imprisonment. 8 8 In
the latter case, justice demands that she be released; in the former case, the
tribunal need not seek her cooperation if it feels that she ought to stay
in prison.
Moreover, the experiences of the ICTs suggest that tribunals cannot easily
distinguish among applicants based on the gravity of their crimes anyway.18 9
By design, international justice only involves extraordinary crimes; the
proposal in certain quarters "never [to] pardon certain crimes, like rape,
murder and war crime"' 90 functionally recommends complete abolition of
early release.
Consequently, the gravity of crimes is yet another factor better suited to
domestic parole hearings than international criminal law.
187. However, the trend in developed countries is away from life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole; for example, it has been declared unconstitutional in Germany, France,
and Italy. Ashley Nellis, Throwing Away the Key: The Expansion of Life Without Parole
Sentences in the United States, 23 FED. SENT'G REP. 27, 30 (2010), http://sentencngproject
.org/doc/publications/incjfederalsentencingreporter.pdf.
iss. See supra Section H.A.
189. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
19o. Pavelid, supra note 29.
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Table 1.
RELEVANT AND IRRELEVANT FACTORS IN DETERMINING EARLY RELEASE
Relevant Factors ICTR, SCSL, ICC
ICTY, STL
MUCT
Cooperation After Sentencing V
Humanitarian Concerns V 





Gravity of Crimes VV
Good Behavior VV





The table above summarizes the analysis in Part II and compares the factors
I have considered with the jurisprudence of the active international tribunals.
As discussed, time served overshadows all other factors at the ICTs, and it
remains to be seen exactly how the SCSL, STL, and ICC will implement the
procedures in their Statutes and Rules. Nevertheless, this table proposes much
stricter standards for early release than those presently applied by any of the
major international tribunals.
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III. OBJECTIONS
A. Expressive Law
One argument against my theory and for presumptive early release claims
that international tribunals fulfill their function as soon as they deliver the
initial sentence; that once the sentence stops ringing in the ears of the
international community, to keep a criminal for much longer would simply be
a waste of money and effort. Ostensibly, by widely publicizing the initial
sentence and downplaying the subsequent early release, nations could express
the same amount of indignation without the political inconvenience, harm
to prisoners, or (admittedly small) monetary cost of keeping criminals
behind bars.
Two major counterarguments suggest themselves. First, even assuming
that the initial sentence were all that mattered in terms of expressive law -a
substantial assumption -early release hobbles every other goal of international
criminal law that jurists typically hold dear. Deterrence is impaired, because
criminals will have committed crimes with relative impunity; retribution is
obviously impaired; reconciliation is impaired insofar as victims' groups are
incensed at the generosity of early release.
Second, expressive law probably demands that the sentence given actually
be served. The early release of convicted criminals after World War II clearly
adulterated the international community's condemnation of their crimes - the
conventional view is that sentences followed by widespread clemencies in the
late forties and fifties expressed nothing more than weak political willpower.' 9 '
As a factual matter, interested parties were fully aware of the extent of releases
in the postwar period, and controversy continues to surround the generous
early release policies of the ICTs today.'92
On net, I suspect that the presumption of early release harms expressive
law more than longer sentences help it. Commentators are struck by the
apparent arbitrariness in releasing prisoners who neither show remorse nor
help to prosecute other criminals. Victims see the presumption as reflecting a
lack of seriousness on the part of the tribunals, rather than as an attempt to
191. See, e.g., Hbert, supra note 32, at 196-202, 205.
192. See, e.g., Felly Kimenyi, Rwanda: ICTR Genocide Convicts in Mali Get Early Release, NEW
TIMEs, Dec. 15, 2012, http://allafrica.comf/stories/2ol12z170o88.html; Pavelid, supra note 29.
See generally supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
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maximize expressive value. This system therefore hurts the credibility of
international justice as a whole.
The symbolism of early release becomes particularly stark when we
consider domestic analogues. Parole is not generally thought to impede the
expressive value of criminal sentences, in part because parole still places
burdensome restrictions on the freedoms of parolees. In contrast, domestic
pardons and commutations usually mitigate the symbolism of the initial
sentence, sometimes to controversial effect (consider, for example, President
George W. Bush's commutation of Lewis "Scooter" Libby's prison sentence, 193
or President Jimmy Carter's commutation of the sentence of brainwashed
heiress-cum-terrorist Patricia "Patty" Hearst' 94). As Part I discusses, early
release in international criminal law is much closer to commutation than to
parole; thus it implies a disclaimer of the initial sentence in much the same way
as commutation would in domestic law.
Justice does not end with sentencing -enforcement is an equally important
task in international criminal law. Inevitably, expressive law demands that
criminals actually be punished.
B. Incomplete Information
A second objection to my theory asks the following questions: What if the
ICTY wished to enforce its full sentences, but was simply unable to do so
because of excessively poor conditions of imprisonment? It might have had a
difficult time criticizing said conditions or moving the prisoner without
insulting the enforcing state. Similarly, what if a defendant were to cooperate
with the Prosecutor subsequent to trial in such a way that public
acknowledgement would endanger her or her family? The President would be
obliged to release the prisoner without explaining the rationale behind the
release. If sufficiently common, such cases could even steer the course of early
release jurisprudence outside of these exceptional cases - an uninformed
successor President might analogize to a past case in which release was granted
without realizing the hidden mitigating factors that drove that case.195
193. Scott Shane & Neil A. Lewis, Bush Commutes Libby Sentence, Saying 30 Months "Is Excessive,"
N.Y. TimEs, July 3, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2oo7/07/o3/washingtoV031ibby.html.
194. Duncan Campbell, Carter Calls for Patty Hearst Pardon, GUARDiAN, Oct. 6, 1999, http://
www.theguardian.com/world/1999/oct/o7/duncancampbellh.
195. For an example of a redaction in an early release decision, see Delid's Early Release, supra
note 50, at 1.
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This story is problematic, but highly speculative. Although we necessarily
cannot know what information Presidents of the Tribunals have chosen not to
make public, it seems unlikely that they would exclude significant factors from
their early release decisions - most importantly because of the predictable
corrupting effect it would have on subsequent decisions. Presidents could
simply include information in their early release decisions and redact them as
necessary.
And, in fact, there are several decisions where redactions have partly
obscured the underlying legal reasoning.9 6 But these cases are the exception
rather than the norm, and it is possible to form a complete picture of policy
without them. It is unlikely that redactions, or even more speculatively, judicial
consideration of factors entirely excluded from the written decisions, have
biased our conception of early release doctrine.
In sum, neither of the above-cataloged objections can scuttle the theory set
out in Part II.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
The most important payoff of Part II is that international courts should
award early release far less often than they do in the status quo. Criminals are
significantly more likely to satisfy the criteria used by the ad hoc Tribunals or
ICC than the more restrictive ones that Part II lays out. Going forward, judges
should therefore limit early release to exceptional cases involving changed
circumstances.
However, courts like the ICTR, ICTY, and MICT may risk substantial
inequality to prisoners who have not yet reached the two-thirds mark if they
abruptly change their policies on early release. Although their Statutes merely
require them to make decisions based on "the interests of justice and the
general principles of law," 97 it is reasonable to think that those principles
include equal treatment for similarly situated prisoners.
At this point, then, prospective policy-building should focus on changes at
the ICC, the SCSL, and the STL, none of which have considered the release of
any prisoners. Aside from the factors laid out in Part II and the concomitant
tightening of clemency, this Part lays out two other suggestions for consistent
and equitable early release policy.
196. See id.; Santid's Early Release, supra note 50, 9 13.
197. See supra note 42.
1826
123:1784 2014
EARLY RELEASE IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
First, tribunals should take care to grant only the kinds of release that they
have been authorized to grant, and draw from domestic law only insofar as it
relates to that variety of release. The domestic law of parole forms a poor basis
for the international law of commutation. International tribunals have different
aims and fewer enforcement-related resource constraints, and should act
accordingly.
On this count, awareness is key. Judges should take some time before even
hearing their first application for early release to agree on general principles by
which to conduct the proceedings. I mean by this not only agreement on the
criteria for early release, although of course these should be established as well.
I also mean that judges should be able to explain, at least to themselves, why
things such as the gravity of crimes or a guilty plea should be considered both
at sentencing and at early release, or why a criminal should be freed in the
absence of any changed circumstances.
Second, tribunals should establish stable advisory panels to advise them on
early release. Much of the inconsistency in the ICTs' early release practice
occurred between succeeding Presidents. The tribunals do not formally
subscribe to stare decisis in their judgments, although they are "reluctant to
overturn prior doctrinal pronouncements due to concerns of stability in the
law."'9' The Presidents have been even less stringent in keeping consistent
standards of early release. Some draw on the criteria of domestic parole more
than others;199 some separately address each of the four factors, while others
address only the most relevant;oo one has even used his authority to grant
conditional, rather than unconditional, release.2 o'
Moreover, because each President handles enforcement issues like early
release as only one of her many duties-she sits as a judge, makes
administrative rulings, and serves as the public face of the Tribunal -she has
less time to devote to the construction of standard, robust procedures. As a
result, each application has a sui generis feel that sacrifices judicial experience
and consistency for a slight gain in flexibility.
198. Alphons M.M. Orie, Stare Decisis in the ICTY Appeal System? Successor Responsibility in the
Hadiihasanovid Case, 10 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 635, 635 (2012).
199. President Claude Jorda in particular. See, e.g., Aleksovski's Early Release, supra note 25;
Doien's Early Release, supra note 125, at 3-4.
2oo. Compare Rajid's Early Release, supra note 154, with Prosecutor v. Blalkid, Case No. IT-95-14-
A, Order of the President on the Application for the Early Release of Tihomir Blaki6 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004), http://www.icty.org/x/cases
/blaskic/acord/en/040729e.htm.
201. See supra note 43.
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Just as bad, the lack of a dedicated decisionmaker may necessitate
excessively simplistic criteria for early release. It is possible that the two-thirds
presumption favored by the ICTs arose out of a desire for simple bright-line
rules to compensate for variance between judges. The revolving door of
Presidents thus not only hurts consistency, but also allows the crudest factors
to dominate early release considerations.
The ICC Rules ameliorate this problem by having a panel of three judges
sit on each sentence reduction hearing.202 By requiring discussion and
consensus before each release, the ICC forces panels to reflect on the purposes
of early release before making a decision. Moreover, regularly rotating hearings
between judges may encourage the ICC to create objective, standard sentence
reduction procedures as a matter of convenience.
On the other hand, spreading authority from a single judge to all of the
judges further reduces the incentive and opportunity for any particular judge to
develop expertise in early release. The ultimate solution would be a permanent
advisory board, consisting of specialists from a number of different countries.
The board could complement the judicial expertise of the panel of
judges, smooth out differences between successive panels, and keep the
proceedings focused squarely on international law instead of wandering into
domestic practice.
The above are just two of many possible structural suggestions for future
courts to consider. The most obvious substantive reform would simply be to
restrict criteria to those suggested in Part II and to eliminate any presumption
of early release. These changes alone would go a long way toward solving
current policy problems.
CONCLUSION
In this Note, I have attempted to explain the historical roots of the modern
two-thirds standard, to offer an alternative theory, and to suggest some basic
improvements. Early release poses difficult questions -theorists differ on the
goals of international criminal law, and no set of policy recommendations can
address every concern. Nonetheless, present doctrine is both theoretically
shaky and politically unpopular. Courts like the ICC would do well to confront
its shortcomings.
202. See ICC Rules, supra note 120, rule 224(1).
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